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Authority and Expertise* 
DANIEL VIEHOFF 
Philosophy, University of Sheffield 
 
 
Call ÒepistocracyÓ a political regime in which the experts, those who know best, rule;
1
 and call  
Òthe epistocratic claimÓ the assertion that the expertsÕ superior knowledge or reliability is Òa 
warrant for their having political authority over others.Ó
2
 Most of us oppose epistocracy and think 
the epistocratic claim is false. But why is it mistaken?  
Contemporary discussions of this question focus on two answers. According to the first, 
expertise could, in principle, be a warrant for authority. What bars the successful justification of 
epistocracy is that the relevant kind of expertise does not exist in politics (either because there are 
no procedure-independent standards of right or wrong in politics, or because, though such 
standards exist, no one knows better than anyone else what they require).
3
 This skeptical position 
comes, however, at a significant cost: Without the assumption that some political decisions are 
better than others, and that some people know better than others what these decisions are, it is 
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1
Estlund 2008, p. 7. For characterizations of the ÒepistocraticÓ position, see also, e.g., pp. 22, 30Ð1, 40, 277Ð8, n.16. 
Historically, perhaps the most influential statement of epistocracy is Plato (2003). 
2
Estlund 2008, p. 30. Cf. also Jerry GausÕs (2011, p. 16) description of what he calls the ÒauthoritarianÓ position. 
3
Richard Kraut (1984, p. 10) attributes a version of this view to Socrates (at least in the early Platonic dialogues). A 
similar view is suggested in Arendt (1977/1961, esp. pp. 246Ð7).  
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difficult to make sense of much of our political practice, including how we criticize politicians 
and choose among candidates for office. 
The second answer accepts that there is expertise of the relevant sort in politics. It argues, 
however, that such expertise does not justify political authority because political justifications are 
subject to special Òacceptability requirements.Ó
4
 Since claims to expertise are normally not 
acceptable to all qualified (reasonable etc.) points of view, they cannot function as premises in 
the justification of political authority, and the epistocratic claim fails.
5
 Yet as a number of critics 
have pointed out, this (broadly Rawlsian) strategy faces significant problems: it is at least unclear 
whether the strategy in fact bars all epistocratic conclusions;
6
 whether there is any principled way 
to draw the distinction between qualified and non-qualified points of views on which it depends;
7
 
and whether principled defenses for it are available and internally consistent.
8
 
But the aim of this article is not to dwell on the problems the existing positions face. It is, 
rather, to outline a third and previously largely overlooked answer, which resists the epistocratic 
claim without either denying the existence of expertise in politics or invoking special 
acceptability requirements for political justifications. The only plausible argument for the 
epistocratic claim, this article argues, focuses on the compensatory role that the expertÕs authority 
plays in correcting the subjectÕs relative unreliability or other agential shortcomings. The expertÕs 
authority is thus justified only if the subject, by adopting a policy of obeying the expertÕs 
directives, does not face problems that are very similar to the ones that the expertÕs authority was 
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4
Estlund 2008, p. 41. 
5
EstlundÕs discussion of his Ògeneral acceptability requirementÓ focuses on justifications of coercion rather than 
authority. But he says that a ÒweakerÓ requirement also applies to authority (ibid., p. 41). It is weaker because 
one particular justification of authorityÑbased on what he calls Ònormative consentÓÑcan do without this 
requirement (cf. ibid., p. 279, n. 2). For other influential defenses of similar requirements, see Gaus (2011) 
and Rawls (1996).   
6
Lippert-Rasmussen 2012. 
7
Enoch 2013. 
8
Wall 2013. 
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meant to solve in the first place. If, for instance, the subject finds it no easier to reliably identify 
what the expertÕs directives require of him than to reliably assess and act on the reasons with 
which the expert is meant to help him, then the expertÕs directives lack the compensatory value 
that would justify her authority. But if some widely accepted empirical conjectures about politics 
in a pluralistic political community are correct, then citizens normally either have no reason to 
adopt a policy of obeying experts, or the experts with regard to whom they have reason to adopt 
such a policy differ, so that no expert has the kind of general authority over the polity that we 
associate with political rule. (We may call this the Ònon-compensation argumentÓ against 
epistocracy.)  
The argument is important both because it helps shed light on the proper relation between 
authority and expertise in general, and because it shows that we can normally reject the 
epistocratic claim without adopting either the skeptical or the Rawlsian strategy, thus 
undercutting whatever support these views derive from the mistaken perception that they are 
necessary for resisting the threat of epistocracy.
9
 Finally, because the anti-epistocratic constraints 
it introduces apply only to justifications of the subjectsÕ duty to obey, but not to the existence or 
activities of political institutions as such, the compensation argument can accommodate our anti-
epistocratic intuitions without excluding epistemic considerations from the design of political 
institutions more generally.  
I begin in section I by briefly explaining what authority and expertise consist in before 
distinguishing different roles that considerations of expertise can play in accounts of authority. In 
particular, I draw a distinction between two claims that talk of epistocracy often conflates: that 
expertise justifies the subjectsÕ duty to obey political decisions because they are made by experts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
I tend to think that this is in fact the main source of intuitive support for both positions. But since I cannot defend 
this claim here, I wonÕt dwell on the effects my argument has on their overall plausibility. 
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(the Òexpertise-obedience claimÓ) on the one hand, and that it justifies the expertÕs right to fill a 
position that carries independently justified authority (the Òexpertise-office claimÓ) on the other. 
Section II sketches what I take to be the strongest argument for the expertise-obedience claim, 
based on the benefit the subject derives from the expertÕs having and exercising authority over 
him. This argument entails, however, that the fact that one person
10
 has expertise justifies her 
authority over another only if the latter can sufficiently reliably identify that she has such 
authority (section III). While this Òidentifiability conditionÓ can in principle be met, specific 
features of political authority make it implausible that any claimant to such authority in fact 
meets it to the degree necessary to justify her claim (section IV). So the expertise-obedience 
claim fails. What about the expertise-office claim? Section V argues that the failure of the 
expertise-obedience claim also undermines the strongest argument for the expertise-office claim. 
But even if experts have no claim to fill positions of authority, neither voters nor institutional 
designers are barred from relying on considerations of expertise in selecting political 
representatives, or in designing the rules governing that selection. 
 
 
I. Authority, Expertise, Epistocracy 
 
Our governments make laws for us and expect us to obey them. They claim, that is, political 
authority over us. Political authority (and practical authority, of which it is a particular instance, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
Throughout this article I speak of experts as persons. With appropriate adjustments, the following discussion also 
applies to non-natural persons, such as legislative bodies.  
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more generally) is the power to impose duties
11
 on another at will. If you have authority over me 
with regard to matter M, and you give me an M-related directive to do x, then I have a duty to do 
x.
12
 (In particular, I have such a duty at least in some cases even if you were mistaken in directing 
me to do x and should have directed me to do y instead.) The stateÕs claim to political authority is 
thus the claim that we, the subjects, must do as the law says because it says so.  
We can helpfully distinguish authority from two other phenomena with which it may be 
confused. First, I may have a duty to do as the law says simply because what the law says is what 
I have a duty to do anyway (say, not to murder or rape). But if I have that duty independently of 
whether the law says so, then my duty is not a matter of the lawÕs authority. Second, we often 
have reason to abide by the law because we will be punished if we donÕt. This too is not a matter 
of authority, since my reason to do as the law says is not Òbecause the law says soÓ but Òbecause 
otherwise I will suffer sanctions.Ó
13
 To distinguish between authority and these other reasons to 
do as the law says, I will reserve talk of Òduties to obey,Ó or of Òreasons to follow the law,Ó for 
cases of authority and will otherwise speak of reasons or duties to conform to the law. 
This article adopts a fairly thin conception of expertise. First, expertise (as I use the term 
here) is a matter of reliably judging a particular subject-matter. This leaves it open whether such 
reliability is the result of greater knowledge, better training in reliable epistemic methods, or 
simply advantageous access to relevant information, and whether or not it goes hand in hand with 
deeper understanding of the relevant subject-matter or whether others recognize the expert as 
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11
This paper uses interchangeably Òbinding reasons,Ó Òduties,Ó and Òrequirements.Ó I take all of these to be what Raz 
(1986) calls Òpreemptive reasons.Ó ÒReasonsÓ (etc.) here mean normative rather than explanatory reasons: 
reasons that in fact justify the agentÕs action rather than reasons she takes to justify her action.  
12
The reverse need not be true: Your directive might impose a duty on me even though you lack authority over me.  
13
If the threat of coercion is our only reason to abide by the law, then the state is no different from the highwayman 
who forces us to hand over our wallet. But in a well-run state coercion is not our only reason to do as the state 
requires. Rather, coercion provides merely a back-up reason to ensure that we conform to other reasons we 
already have. Whether the stateÕs use of coercion is legitimate is conceptually and practically distinct from 
whether the state has authority over its subjects. Here I will not consider what role expertise can play in 
legitimating state coercion.  
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such. Second, expertise is a matter of relative reliability: the expert knows better, or judges more 
reliably, than others the truth about those matters that fall within her domain of expertise. While 
this characterization deviates in some ways from our everyday conception of expertise,
14
 it 
captures those features that (I show in the next section) explain the significance often attributed to 
expertise in accounts of practical authority.  
What follows practicallyÑin terms of the reasons for action that we haveÑfrom that fact 
that someone has expertise so understood? David Estlund has recently introduced the term 
ÒepistocracyÓ for a regime in which the knowers rule. To this corresponds a theoretical position 
according to which greater knowledge or competenceÑfor short, expertiseÑjustifies rule. It is 
important to recognize from the start that this epistocratic position does not follow 
straightforwardly from the fact that expertise is a virtue we value in rulers, since the latter may be 
true even where expertise does not determine who has authority over whom. For instance, 
suppose (counterfactually) that we each had a duty to obey our parents because they created us. 
Even though parental authority would then be independent of parentsÕ competence, competence 
would be a virtue in parents. One distinction to draw, then, is between a weak Òexpertise-virtue 
claim,Ó according to which greater competence or knowledge is a virtue in an authority, and the 
stronger epistocratic position, that expertise justifies one personÕs rule over another.  
More importantly, we must draw a further distinction between two claims that discussions 
of epistocracy tend to conflate.
15
 On the one hand, that A has expertise can justify SÕs duty to do 
as A says. (Expertise, I will say, is the basis of the subjectsÕ duty to obey, and thus justifies 
authority.) On the other hand, that A has expertise can justify assigning a position of authority to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For discussion see Goldman 2001 and Brewer 1998.  
15
See, e.g., Estlund 2008, p.40: ÒAfter all, from the fact É that you know better than the rest of us what should be 
done, it certainly does not follow in any obvious way that you may rule, or that anyone has a duty to obey 
you.Ó  
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A, where the subjectÕs duty to obey the holder of that position is justified on independent grounds. 
(On this view, expertise is the basis for assigning positions of authority, but not the basis of the 
duty to obey.
16
) Both of these could be said to justify rule by the knowers (that is, epistocracy as 
Estlund has characterized it). Yet they do so in different ways: while one position explains why 
those who are knowers ought to be obeyed, the second position explains why those who are to be 
obeyed ought to be knowers. 
Let me spell out explicitly what each of these claims amounts to with regard to the relation 
between expertise and authority, and what their practical implications are.  
(1) The expertise-obedience claim: The expertÕs superior reliability justifies her authority 
over others. If the expertise-obedience claim is true, then those others have a duty to 
obey the directives of the expert because she is an expert.  
(2) The expertise-office claim: Expertise is the proper basis for assigning offices or 
positions of authority to people, even if the authority that the office carries is justified 
independently of the expertise of the office-holder. If the expertise-office claim is 
true, then the rules governing the assignment of offices should take into account 
expertise in determining how offices are filled.   
To further clarify the distinction between these claims it will help to consider in more detail the 
view that expertise is the proper basis for assigning positions of authority. Consider, for example, 
a system of laws and institutions that has authority over its subjects because it enables the 
coordination of expectations and projects. Such a system is partly constituted by offices that 
come with certain rights, duties, and powers. The power of an office-holder H to make 
authoritative decisions is based on the place that this office has in the overall system, and the 
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16
In fact, the matter is more complicated, since the authority of the office too could be justified on epistemic grounds 
(for instance, because the office holder alone has access to relevant information). What matters for our 
purposes is that AÕs authority is conditional on holding the office, and not based on AÕs personal expertise.   
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systemÕs authority is in turn justified by the need for coordination: HÕs power derives from her 
office, and if another person G filled the office in HÕs stead, then G rather than H would have this 
power.
17
 Someone could now argue that a particular office ought to be filled by certain people 
and not others (and perhaps even, more strongly, that certain people have a right to fill this 
office). For instance, one might suggest that holding this office is an honor; and that this honor is 
due to K, the wisest and most knowledgeable person around.
18
 (K deserves to hold this office, just 
as the winner of a competition deserves her prize.) Less contentiously, one might think that a 
good legal-political system will have rules that determine who fills its offices, and that according 
to these rules the wisest or most knowledgeable person will be assigned the office in question. In 
either case K could complain if she were denied the relevant office. But since the office-holderÕs 
authority derives from the office and its place in the system as a whole, if the office is mistakenly 
assigned to L rather than K, then L (but not K) has the corresponding authority. 
One reason why the expert-obedience claim and the expert-office claim are commonly run 
together may be that they both fit the general description of the epistocratic positionÑthat greater 
knowledge justifies rule. Another explanation may be that, if A has authority over S with regard 
to matters M because of AÕs expertise on M, then it would in fact make sense to assign to A 
whatever offices carry authority on M-related matters, because doing so would avoid clashes 
between the (personal) authority A has with regard to M qua expert and the (impersonal, 
institutional) authority another has qua office-holder. From the perspective of institutional design 
in general, and of concern with the question whether an epistemic elite should rule in particular, it 
might then look like the expertise-obedience claim identifies a particular (and perhaps often 
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17
Perhaps not just anybody can fill the office, because the office holder must meet some minimum standards. What 
matters here is that the justification of the subjectÕs duty to obey significantly underdetermines who must hold 
the office, so that there is room for invoking alternative considerations, like expertise.  
18
On the link between office and honor, see Aristotle 1998, bk. III, ch. 10, 27Ð31, p. 83. 
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conclusive) reason for adopting the expertise-office claim. But if (as I argue next) the expertise-
obedience claim is normally unjustified with regard to political decision-making, then thisÑto 
my mind most plausibleÑargument for the expertise-office claim also falters. Or so I suggest 
towards the end of this article. 
 
 
II. Expertise-Based Authority 
 
In the previous section I introduced what I called the Òexpertise-obedience claimÓ: one personÕs 
expertise on matter M justifies her authority over others with regard to M-related issues. But how 
does AÕs expertise justify another person SÕs duty to follow AÕs directives?  
One possibility (suggested by the previous discussion of a knowledge-based right to a 
public office) appeals to the notion of entitlement: if you are an expert then you are entitled to be 
obeyed with regard to those issues on which you have expertise.
19
 (The most intuitive basis for 
such a claim may be desert: Obeying you is the right way to show the respect that you deserve 
qua expert.) 
I will not argue here in detail against this position, mainly because it is not clear to me what 
the argument for such an entitlement claim would be to begin with. Why should respect for 
experts require obeying them, rather than, say, carefully listening to what they have to say, or 
rewarding them with trophies? So I merely mention it to bring out the distinctive character of the 
alternative proposal I develop, according to which expertise justifies authority because the 
expertÕs having and exercising this power benefits the subjects. According to this service 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
Cf. EstlundÕs (2008, p. 40) question, Ò[W]hat kind of principle might explain why experts are not necessarily 
entitled to be bosses?Ó 
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justification of expertise-based authority, the expert has the normative power to change the 
subjectsÕ reasons at will because, by having and exercising this power, she provides them with 
guidance that helps them act more reliably (or equally reliably at a lower cost in time and energy) 
in accordance with whatever normative standards apply to them than they could if she did not 
possess or exercise the power and they had to try to follow the applicable standards directly.
20
  
Let me spell out this argument in some more detail:  
(1) Let us say that A counts as an expert for S with regard to issue M if AÕs judgments 
relating to M are more reliable than the judgments S makes regarding M. (Notice that 
expertise is thus defined relative to both particular agents and particular issues.) Thus, 
when M is a practical matter, and the judgment is about how S ought to act in light of 
the relevant M-related reasons, then by following AÕs expert judgment of M rather 
than his own, S may be able to more reliably conform to his M-related reasons.
21
  
(2) We have reason to act as best we can (within the limits set by the need for time and 
resources associated with a decent life) to conform to moral requirements that apply 
to us (such as respecting the rights of others), and thus to take (permissible) means 
towards conforming to them.
22
 Among these means is following anotherÕs directives 
instead of acting on our own, less reliable assessment of the matter at issue.
23
  
(3) So we have reason to follow an expertÕs directives (and set aside our own, competing, 
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20
The notion of ÒserviceÓ is borrowed from Joseph RazÕs influential theory of authority (Raz 2006). But the 
characterization I offer here differs from RazÕs account so as to better capture the idea of service (and exclude 
entitlement justifications).  
21
Since we can usually conform to reasons to a greater or lesser degree, the relevant assessments of reliability will 
consider both how likely the expert is to identify the correct course of action, and how far she deviates from 
that course when she goes wrong.  
22
Sometimes it is less important to correctly conform to the relevant reasons and more significant to act on oneÕs own 
judgment. (Think of romantic choices.) By focusing on cases where authority helps us act on moral 
requirements, I mean to largely avoid the complications this raises. 
23
As I show below, the conditions under which submitting to an expertÕs authority is in fact useful are more 
demanding than may initially appear.  
  11!
assessment of the matter) with regard to the moral requirements that apply to us. The 
expert thus has the power to change our reasons for action at will, by giving us 
binding directives; and her having this power is justified by the benefit or service it 
provides to us.  
It is worth emphasizing two features of this account. First, authority of the sort just considered is 
compensatory in nature: Obeying the more reliable expertÑtreating her directives as bindingÑ
enables me to correct or compensate for my own deficiency or unreliability in assessing M. 
Assuming that the issues with regard to which decisions are made are generally of moral 
significance, the decisions of someone who is an expert with regard to these mattersÑto be 
precise, someone who is more reliable than I am in identifying the relevant reasons and what 
course of action best conforms to themÑwill be authoritative for me insofar as her power to 
impose duties on me helps compensate for my shortcomings.
24
 (This will be central to the 
argument in section III.) 
Second, I focus here on cases where the purported authority is, at least in part, an expert on 
normative matters. This is not necessary for an account of expertise-based authority as such, as 
the following example illustrates: We are on a plane, and in the middle of the flight you have a 
heart attack. I call for help, and one of the other passengers, D, reveals himself to be a doctor. D 
cannot perform whatever actions are necessary to resuscitate you; but he directs me how to do 
them. Since I have, I am assuming, a duty to try to save your life (at little cost to myself etc.), and 
the best way to do so is to follow DÕs orders, I ought to be doing what D tells me to do, and I 
ought to be doing it because he tells me to do it. Yet D need not have any expertise on normative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24
Much more could be said about such justifications of expertise-based authority. In particular, it could be defended 
against some objections that have been raised against broadly instrumental justifications of practical authority. 
I cannot consider these. But notice the dialectic here: If it turns out that instrumental justifications of the sort 
just sketched fail anyway, then so do arguments for the expertise-obedience claim that rest on them. And 
showing that this claim Ð and with it much of what is often labeled ÒepistocracyÓ Ð lacks support is the aim of 
this essay. 
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mattersÑhe need not be particularly good at determining whether I have a duty to save your life 
in the first place. So what justifies this articleÕs focus on cases involving normative expertise? 
Notice that in the example at hand the reason-giving force of DÕs directive is conditional: if I 
have no undefeated reason to save you, then DÕs order will not change that. But political 
authorities do not usually claim to give us conditional orders of this sort. They do not merely tell 
us that, insofar as we have reason to provide our children with an opportunity to a decent life, we 
ought to send them to school; they tell us that we have to send them to school full stop. This is 
reflected in a distinctive feature of political institutions: They generally do not merely pass laws 
and expect us to conform to them. They also coercively enforce these laws, and thus intend to 
make the option of non-conformity rationally less eligible. Yet it is difficult to see how such 
coercion could be justified if it werenÕt for the fact that all other options are anyway unacceptable 
given the balance of reasons.
25
 So political authority is meant to give us a final answer as to how 
we should act, not just an intermediate conclusion that still leaves it open how reasons overall 
line up.
26
 And such a final answer requires making normative judgments about how competing 
considerations are to be balanced, what moral requirements apply to us when, and so on.
27
 (This 
feature of political authority will be central to the argument in section IV.) 
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25
I take this to be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the legitimacy of state coercion to which the 
subject has not validly consented. 
26
This is a feature of political authority in particular, not of practical authority in general. Someone may have 
practical authority with regard to a subset of reasonsÑsay, reasons of healthÑbut not others.  
27
I am setting aside cases where the expertÕs authority is not ÒfinalÓ in the same way. For instance, if citizens have a 
democratically imposed duty to minimize the risk of spreading infectious diseases, and the best way to do so 
is to obey the directives of the governmentÕs chief scientist, then the chief scientist may have instrumentally 
justified authority. But this is not a core case of political authority, for the reasons just explained. I am not 
alone in setting aside these kinds of cases. EstlundÕs discussion, for instance, focuses quite consistently on 
normative expertise. See, e.g., EstlundÕs (2008, p. 30) formulation of the ÒKnowledge TenetÓ of the 
epistocratic argument. 
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III. From Expertise to Political Authority: Identifiability and Convergence 
 
In the previous section, I sketched a service justification of practical authority based on expertise. 
The expertÕs power to give binding directives (that replace the subjectÕs own less reliable 
judgments of the underlying reasons) is justified if and because it benefits the subject. Such 
expertise-based justification of authority is, I explained, compensatory: A has the power to 
impose duties on S at will if her having and exercising such power helps S sidestep the problems 
that his own unreliability creates when it comes to doing what he morally ought to do.  
In this section, I build on this sketch to identify two conditions a successful expertise-based 
justification of political authority must satisfy. First, to establish AÕs expertise-based authority 
over S along these lines, it is not enough to show that AÕs decisions are in fact more reliable than 
are SÕs own judgments (that is, that A meets the Òexpertise conditionÓ). S must also be sufficiently 
reliable when it comes to identifying whether A has authority over him. Specifically, SÕs 
reliability with regard to AÕs authority must be greaterÑindeed, usually quite a bit greaterÑthan 
is SÕs reliability with regard to M-related requirements that apply to him. I call this the 
Òidentifiability condition.Ó Second, to establish AÕs legitimate political authority requires 
showing that A has justified authority over most of the members of the relevant polity. Thus to 
establish political authority based on expertise, the justifications establishing the subjectsÕ duties 
must converge in their conclusions about whose directives the subjects ought to obey. I call this 
the Òconvergence condition.Ó 
 
A.  Identifiability 
 
Why is meeting the expertise conditionÑthat the bearer of authority A is more reliable than the 
  14!
subject SÑnot sufficient to establish AÕs authority over S?
28
 According to the justification of 
authority we are considering, the expertÕs directives are meant to compensate for SÕs unreliability 
in determining how he ought to act. But they can do so only if S can more reliably judge what he 
ought to do after his normative situation has been changed by the expertÕs directives than he 
could before. And this condition will be met only if S can more reliably judge what 
authoritatively imposed duties apply to him than what reasons he has independently of the 
authorityÕs directives. Yet to reliably judge what authoritatively imposed duties apply to him, S 
must normally be in a position to reliably judge who has authority over him, and what that person 
directs him to do.  
Let me emphasize that I am not assuming here that in general an agent has reason to do x 
only if she can reliably judge that she has such reason. Instead the identifiability requirement I 
rely on here follows from the particular character of compensatory justifications of authority. 
More specifically, it follows from the fact that expertise-based authority is justified by the 
benefits it provides to the subjects, and the way in which such authority is meant to benefit them. 
One useful way to think about authority is as a policy adopted by the subject: A has de facto 
authority over S if S has adopted a policy of doing what A directs even if certain reasons (those 
that AÕs directives exclude) would normally be sufficient to justify not acting as A directs. A has 
justified authority over S only if SÕs adopting such a deliberative policy is overall beneficial 
because it reduces SÕs risk of failing to act on the reasons he has. But if by adopting such a policy 
S cannot in fact reduce that risk, because S is no better placed to reliably identify what the policy 
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28
Conditions on the identifiability of political authority are common in the history of political thought. See, e.g., 
LockeÕs First Treatise (2003, ¤124, p. 76) and HobbesÕs Leviathan (1651/1986, ch. 33, p. 426).  More 
recently, Melissa Lane has emphasized that an authority must have ÒmarksÓ by which it can be picked out if it 
is to help us overcome the problems associated with the state of nature (Lane 1999). Raz (2006), too, has 
recognized the importance of what he calls ÒknowabilityÓ for justifications of authority. These authors do not, 
however, pay due attention to identifiabilityÕs comparative character; nor do they explain what follows for the 
justification of expertise-based political authority.  
  15!
requires than he is to reliably identify the reasons that apply to him in the first place, then 
adopting the policy does not benefit S, and the justification of AÕs authority fails.
29
  
It is not uncommon that what I have instrumental reason to do depends on my actual 
capacities and deficiencies. (Whether I have instrumental reason to walk or to cycle to school 
depends on whether I am a fast walker, or know how to ride a bike.) The argument here applies 
this general observation to the specific case of expertise-based authority: SÕs action, to adopt a 
policy of following the authorityÕs directives, is valuable only insofar as it helps the subject 
perform other actions, namely, to conform to those reasons that the expert can judge more 
reliably than the subject can. But then whether the policy is worth adopting despite SÕs 
deficiencies depends on whether successfully acting on it is possible even though directly acting 
on the underlying reasons is not. Since in the case under consideration authority is conditional on 
expertise, reliably judging whose directives impose duties on him requires S to reliably identify 
the expert and what her directives require. After all, if S cannot reliably identify who has 
authority (which, here, requires meeting the expertise condition), he cannot reliably identify 
whose directives impose duties on him, and thus can no more reliably judge what he ought to do 
after receiving the expertÕs directives than before. In fact, assuming that the expert herself is not 
perfectly reliable in judging the underlying reasons that apply to S, S benefits from the expertÕs 
authority only if he is sufficiently more reliable in identifying the expert, and the duties she 
imposes on him, than he is in assessing the underlying reasons so as to make up for the expertÕs 
imperfect reliability. 
One point is worth highlighting here: In principle, S could reliably identify the expertÕs 
directives even if S does not know that the expert is an expert, or that the expertÕs authority is 
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Note that the issue is whether S can reliably identify A, not whether S in fact identifies A or recognizes her authority. 
If S can reliably identify A, but fails to deploy this capacity (and thus fails to recognize that A has authority), 
the compensatory justification of AÕs authority nonetheless stands.  
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justified by her expertise. Consider parental authority. Such authority plausibly rests on the 
parentÕs greater reliability in judging what the child ought to do. But the child can benefit from 
that greater reliability even if it neither knows that this is what justifies the parentÕs authority nor 
identifies the bearer of authority as an expert (and instead simply obeys the parent qua parent). A 
policy of obedience is opaque if the subject does not have access to the considerations that in fact 
justify the decision-makerÕs authority. Such a subject will normally identify the bearer of 
authority A under a description (ÒparentÓ) other than the one under which AÕs authority is 
justified (ÒexpertÓ). On a transparent policy, by contrast, the subject does have access to the 
underlying justification. The features by which S identifies A will thus either coincide with those 
features that justify AÕs authority over S, or S will at least be aware that the identificatory feature 
is appropriate because it is a proxy for the justificatory feature. (We will return to this distinction 
in the next section, which discusses the value of both transparent and opaque policies.)  
 
 
B.  Convergence 
 
In section II, I emphasized one important feature of political authorities: They purport to establish 
final rather than intermediate conclusions about how their subjects are to act. So if political 
authority is based on expertise, then the bearer of authority must reliably judge what the subjects 
have, all things considered, reason to do with regard to those issues regulated by law. She must 
be able to assess competing considerations that bear on which actions are obligatory and legally 
enforceable, which ends are worth pursuing, and what is to be done when some worthwhile or 
obligatory actions are practically incompatible. She must, that is, have distinctly moral expertise.  
Here I want to highlight a second feature of political authority. As Leslie Green has 
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emphasized, the authority asserted by states is general in character: they claim Òthe ability to 
regulate the vital interests of everyone within their territory. É All those living within a certain 
area, or all fulfilling certain conditions [of membership], are deemed to be bound.Ó
30
 Even if I 
personally have consented to ParliamentÕs authority over me, as long as most other people within 
its purported jurisdiction have not (and are not otherwise bound by its directives), ParliamentÕs 
power lacks the generality that political authority requires. The generality of political authority is 
reflected in the kinds of tasks that we expect political institutions to fulfill: they settle what 
system of property rights exists around here, what collective defense efforts we take against 
outsiders, or how we ensure that the poorest among us are taken care of. And since each of these 
normally requires the coordinated efforts of many people, each of these tasks can also normally 
be fulfilled only if enough members of our community abide by the authorityÕs decision about 
how they are to be fulfilled. The assumption of generality is, finally, connected to the intuitive 
thought that political authority is authority for a political community: for it to count as such, it 
must be an authority for at least a sufficient number (even if not all) of the communityÕs 
membersÑenough of them so that the resulting acts can properly count as acts of the community.  
Since someone has political authority only if her power is sufficiently general and covers 
most members of the polity she purports to rule, any attempt to justify political authority by 
appeal to expertise must satisfy a Òconvergence conditionÓ: It is not enough to show that all, or 
most, members of the polity are bound by the directives of an expert. There must also be 
significant convergence among them with regard to which expert they ought to obey. The same 
person must have authority over most or all of them.  
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Green 1988, pp. 83, 84. 
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IV. The Challenge  
 
For A to have political authority based on her expertise, both the identifiability condition and the 
convergence condition must be satisfied. She must, that is, be reliably identifiable as the bearer of 
authority by those bound by her directives; and this condition must be satisfied vis--vis most 
members of the polity over which she asserts her authority, so they converge on her as the source 
of binding directives. The purpose of this section is to argue that, given some widely recognized 
facts about our political and moral life, it is highly unlikely that both of these conditions are met 
simultaneously. Some identification policies that subjects can adopt (those policies I earlier 
called ÒtransparentÓ) are valuable, and justify the authority of the person whom the subject 
identifies as having authority; but these policies are unlikely to lead to convergence. Other 
identification policies (those I earlier called ÒopaqueÓ) may lead to convergence; but they are 
very likely not worth adopting, all things considered. There is thus, I conjecture, no successful 
expertise-based justification of political authority for the kinds of people that we are, living in the 
kinds of polities we are familiar with.  
 
 
A.  Transparent Strategies 
 
Let me begin with transparent identification strategies: the subjects know that the purported 
authorityÕs legitimacy rests on her expertise, and they seek to reliably identify who has authority 
over them by identifying who has the requisite expertise. Now it is quite likely that they cannot 
identify the expert directly, but must instead rely on features that indicate expertise. (When 
choosing among doctors, I normally cannot directly assess their expertise; but I can find out 
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where they were trained, whether they have had to fight a disproportionate number of malpractice 
suits, and so on.) Still, insofar as the subject attends to these features because he considers them 
to be indicative of expertise, he will adjust his identification strategy if it turns out that these 
features are not in fact useful indicators of the underlying characteristic (if, for instance, it turns 
out a particular medical school does a less good job than previously thought training its students).  
Transparent identification, I argue, is incompatible with expertise-based justifications of 
political authority in a community characterized by the diversity of moral and political outlooks 
familiar from pluralistic societies. Political authority requires that (enough) citizens converge on 
a particular moral expert; and if identification is transparent, this requires them to be able to 
reliably identify that expert as a moral expert. But our capacity for reliably identifying moral 
experts is closely tied to our capacity for reliably identifying moral considerations more generally.  
At the extreme, the link may be so close that those who are unreliable judges of first-order 
moral reasons, and would thus benefit from the directives of a moral expert, will also be 
unreliable moral judges of moral expertise, and thus cannot help themselves to the benefits of 
expertise-based authority. But often the link is looser, and our incapacity to reliably identify first-
order moral reasons does not completely bar us from reliably identifying others whose judgments 
are more reliable than our own. Yet even then the connection is sufficiently close that those who 
hold quite divergent moral views will reliably identify different experts, and thus different 
experts will have justified authority over them.
31
 
We may try to identify moral experts either based on what decisions they have made (their 
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My argument thus falls between the pessimism of Scott Brewer (who worries that non-experts can never identify 
experts), and the optimism of Elizabeth Anderson (who thinks that such identification is relatively 
unproblematic) (Brewer 1998; Anderson 2011). AndersonÕs optimistic view has greater plausibility with 
regard to scientific instead of moral expertise. But even then identifiability is an achievement, and someone 
sufficiently dedicated to the task may be able to effectively undermine its preconditions, and destroy some of 
the practical benefits scientific expertise could provide. (Climate change denialism may depend for its 
political impact on just this.) 
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track-record) or how they go about making decisions (their skills or methods).
32
 Let me start with 
the former. In many contexts reliance on track-record is attractive because our capacity to judge 
whether the expert can do x is quite distinct from our capacity to do x ourselves. I cannot make 
shoes and yet I can judge who is a good shoemaker because the skills I need to judge whether 
shoes fit me are quite different from those involved in making shoes. And despite our different 
view on medicine in general, you and I may be able to converge in our identification of a good 
doctor because we can both see that she has a higher success rate fighting diseases than her 
colleagues.  
Moral expertise is importantly different. The capacity involved in forming moral judgments 
ex ante is the very same one we deploy to assess anotherÕs moral judgments ex post. To assess 
someoneÕs moral track-record with regard to M, I have no standard to rely on other than my own 
considered view of M.
33
 And this close link between judging moral reasons and judging moral 
experts makes it difficult to envisage political authority based on moral expertise. In a pluralistic 
political community, citizens significantly disagree not only in their initial assessment of moral 
questions, but also in their considered judgment. Furthermore, in a large polity there are many 
potential expertsÑmany people whose track record each of us may consider and potentially find 
superior to our own. I can reliably identify someone as a moral expert by her track-record only by 
asking whether her moral views conform to my own considered judgment of the matter. If your 
considered judgment and my considered judgment diverge to a significant degree, and our 
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I am setting aside here a third option familiar from medical and other contexts: referral by other (identifiable) 
expert. The kinds of considerations I offer in the text also extend to this third (anyway rather less plausible) 
strategy.  
33
This does not yet bar me from compensating for my own shortcomings by instead following a moral expert. We 
must often act before we had a chance to form a considered judgment of what morality requires. If I discover 
that, when you and I disagree at time t about what I morally ought to do, I commonly come to agree with your 
assessment once I have had a chance to form a more considered (and thus presumably more reliable) 
judgment at time t+1, then I may be able to reliably identify you as someone whose judgment is more reliable 
than mine under time constraints. 
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considered judgments are the basis on which we assess other peopleÕs track-record and expertise, 
then (assuming our community is reasonably large) it is very likely that the person I can reliably 
identify as being more reliable than I am is someone other than the person you can reliably 
identify as being more reliable than you are.
34
 But then it follows that different persons have 
authority over each of us, and neither of them has general authority over our political community. 
What if we identify moral experts, not based on what judgments they have formed in the 
past, but rather how they form their judgments? Despite our disagreements about a medical issue, 
you and I may easily agree that the doctor, with the training and the instruments to diagnose the 
problem, is more reliable than either of us. So perhaps I can also identify a moral expert based on 
the skills, virtues, or tools she brings to bear on the matter? The problem is that, with regard to 
moral skills or virtues, there is a significant trade-off between accessibility and predictive power. 
Some indicia of anotherÕs morally relevant skills are easily accessible; but they also tend to have 
little power predicting her reliability or distinguishing her from many other potential claimants to 
expertise-based authority. Other indicia, by contrast, would uniquely mark her as the most 
reliable judge around here; but they are difficult to access, and my assessment of them depends 
on my own considered moral judgment, so that the convergence condition is once again unlikely 
to be satisfied. 
Let me start with the latter. There may be distinctive moral virtues or capacities, capacities 
that are displayed in moral judgment in particular, and that would, if possessed, make someone a 
much more reliable moral judge than others. But to assess these distinctively moral capacities, we 
must deploy our own moral judgment and determine whether anotherÕs judgments or actions 
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Furthermore, even if A has expertise-based authority over you and I can reliably identify A as being more reliable 
than I am myself, this does not suffice to establish AÕs authority over me. If I can just as reliably identify 
another person B who is still more reliable, then I have instrumental reason to treat as authoritative B rather 
than A, since treating as authoritative A and treating as authoritative B are mutually exclusive where A and B 
make decisions on the same subject-matter and may disagree. 
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show her to be especially attuned to moral considerations. And that returns us to the previous 
problem: Since we must each rely on our own considered judgment of what moral considerations 
apply, our disagreement with regard to that judgment will likely translate into divergence in our 
identification of reliable moral judges.   
Not all morally relevant capacities may be assessable only on the basis of oneÕs own moral 
judgment. Some such capacities are also displayed outside of moral contexts: Lack of bias or a 
capacity for disinterested reflection, for instance, may be revealed in an agentÕs deliberative 
endeavors more generally. So I may find it relatively easy to know about someone that she is 
generally unbiased and reflective; and if I have reason to believe that I am biased, or incapable of 
adequate reflection on the issue at hand, then I may have reason to defer to her. The problem is, 
however, that the criteria so revealed are unlikely to uniquely identify her as the person others too 
ought to follow: Even if I have reason to follow her (and I may not, either because, though she is 
unbiased, she lacks other predicates, such as distinctive moral virtues, that are relevant, or 
because others who are also unbiased more clearly possess these predicates), others may not 
because they themselves are suitably unbiased, or because they can as reliably identify others as 
being more unbiased than she is.  
The problem with transparent strategies is thus this: Those features that can be reliably 
identified without invoking oneÕs own moral judgment, and with regard to which we may thus be 
reasonably likely to agree with others, are features that will normally not suffice to mark out their 
bearer as someone who has expertise-based authority over us. And those features that are likely 
to suffice to identify someone as a moral expert for us are identifiable only on the basis of our 
own moral judgments, which are likely to diverge from that of our fellow citizens. Thus in a 
transparent practice of identifying authorityÑa practice in which the subjects seek to identify the 
authority qua moral expertÑthe pluralism of moral outlooks typical of political communities 
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makes implausible the convergence that political authority requires.  
 
 
B.  Opaque Strategies 
 
For A to have expertise-based authority over S, S must be able to reliably identify A. But, I 
flagged earlier, he need not identify her as an expertÑthat is, under that description. Now 
imagine a society in which a widely accepted social norm requires citizens to follow the 
directives of some person A, who, though in fact an expert, is not (by the terms of the norm) 
identified as such. Citizens who abide by the norm will thus benefit from expert directives. And if 
the content of the norm is such that citizens who adopt it converge in their judgment as to who 
rules, the problem of disagreement that transparent policies face may also be avoided. Might such 
an opaque identification strategy thus succeed in justifying expertise-based political authority?  
Some may object to any justification of authority that requires opacity. Certainly opacity 
entails that the justification cannot be offered to and accepted by the person whom the authorityÕs 
directives are meant to bind. Such justifications cannot, that is, serve a useful role in persuading 
someone who asks: ÒWhy should I obey you?Ó Perhaps this is sufficient to deny them any 
important role in our political life.  
But even if it is not sufficient, there are other grounds for doubting that opaque strategies 
can justify expertise-based political authority. For S to benefit from an expertÕs authority, though 
S need not identify the expert as an expert, he must identify her as having authority, and her 
directives as reason-giving. Otherwise he would be no better positioned to conform to the 
underlying reasons that apply to him by being under her authority than by not being so. For S to 
identify A as having authority, S must have some understanding of what it is to have authority, 
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and who has it. This does not, however, require a correct view of why someone has authority. If S 
holds the view that A has authority because A has some special feature F (which S does not take 
to be either expertise or a proxy for expertise), and F is in fact sufficiently correlated with 
expertise, then S benefits from the practice of treating a bearer of F as a source of authoritative 
directive, even if he does not know or understand why that practice in fact benefits him.
35
 (Think 
again of the child that takes the fact that A is its parent as an adequate basis for treating AÕs 
directives as binding.)  
Adopting the policy ÒTreat bearers of F as having authorityÓ may thus be instrumentally 
valuable as long as F is in fact appropriately correlated with expertise. To be more precise: such a 
strategy is worth adopting as long as, by adopting it, S will reliably follow the directives of 
genuine experts rather than of non-experts, and will thereby achieve an overall improvement in 
her conformity to the underlying reasons compared to trying to identify and act on those 
underlying reasons directly. It is important to emphasize that adopting an identification strategy is 
worthwhile only if the overall effects of adopting it are positive. For instance, if relying on the 
strategy increases conformity with reasons during one period, but decreases conformity with 
reasons during another, and the agent deploying the strategy is in no position to reliably 
distinguish between these periods (and thus cannot stop using the strategy when its effects are 
negative), then the value of adopting the strategy depends on the net effect it has on the agentÕs 
conformity with reasons across the two periods.  
I want to suggest that opaque identification strategies are likely not worth adopting in 
politics. First, an opaque policy is unlikely to be stably positively valuable. Bearers of authority 
commonly derive personal benefits from their position, whether in the form of respect and 
admiration or of financial remuneration and gifts. This provides significant incentives for non-
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Pace Lane 1999, pp. 222Ð3.  
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experts to acquire characteristic F without bothering to acquire expertise. As the link between F 
and expertise weakens, the benefits to the subject vanish, and further obedience becomes costly, 
whether because we have intrinsic interests in acting on our own judgments or because the newly 
minted bearers of F have a non-zero probability of abusing their power to advance their own ends.  
Second, it is unlikely that the identification strategy will be adjusted once it has become 
costly rather than beneficial. Since the identification strategy is opaque, the subject is not in a 
position to abandon the strategy when it turns costly, or adjust it to better track expertise. In 
principle we could imagine someone else adjusting the strategy: The bearer of authority may be 
able to direct the subjects to look at some feature other than F to identify bearers of authority in 
the future. Or some third party could step in and remove the purported bearers of authority and 
replace them with someone who has expertise. (A parent may teach a child that, past a certain age, 
it need no longer obey its parents. And parental authority is at least to some extent supervised by 
state institutions.) But in politics it is difficult to see who would have the incentives and power to 
pursue such adjustments. The bearers of authority will normally lack the incentives, since this 
would undermine their power; and they may in fact be in no position to identify what features 
other than F do correlate with genuine moral expertise. And in politics (unlike in the case of 
parental authority) there is normally no third party able to intervene and revise the existing 
practice of obedience.
36
  
In light of these problems the expected value of the opaque identification strategy in 
politics is likely negative overall. Consequently the strategy is likely not worth adopting to begin 
with; and the subject thus lacks reason to abide by the decisions of Fs identified as bearers of 
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Let me flag one complication: In a democratic polity, the electorate may be able to remove politicians whom they 
deem morally incompetent. For various reasons I cannot develop here, I doubt this would suffice to sustain 
sufficient moral reliability in the system to justify its expertise-based political authority. In any event, even if 
it did suffice, we would be left with a form of democratic epistocracy that may be quite unproblematic insofar 
as our anti-epistocratic commitments are at bottom pro-democratic ones.  
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authority even if those Fs are in fact experts. 
 
 
C.  The Distinctiveness of the Compensatory Argument 
 
I have suggested that distinctive features of political decision-making render it very difficult for 
many of us to reliably identify the same person as possessing expertise-based authority on the 
difficult question of what we should, all things considered, do. Yet political authorities ordinarily 
claim the power to decide just that question for most members of the political community. The 
argument shows, then, why expertise, even if it can in principle be the basis of practical authority, 
cannot in practice justify the expertise-obedience claim with regard to political authorities. 
Crucially, it shows that the expertise-obedience claim can be rejectedÑand our anti-epistocratic 
political convictions accommodatedÑwithout either denying that standards of truth or 
correctness apply to politics or appealing to the acceptability constraints on political justification 
that philosophers in the Rawlsian tradition invoke. Whether someone has expertise-based 
authority over us depends on whether we, as we actually are (and not our idealized ÒreasonableÓ 
counterparts), can more reliably identify the expert than we can identify the reasons with regard 
to which her expertise is meant to guide us. And so it is the fact that we, as we actually are, do 
not converge in our reliable identification of moral experts that makes expertise-based 
justifications of political authority implausible. 
Let me highlight what I take to be the deeper methodological difference between the anti-
epistocratic argument offered here and arguments for the same conclusion that depend on 
Rawlsian acceptability requirements. Acceptability requirements rest on substantive moral claims, 
while the argument against epistocracy offered here simply reflects the basic compensatory 
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structure of expertise-based justifications of authority. One way to see this is to recognize that my 
argument (unlike RawlsÕs or EstlundÕs) is independent of claims about political (or moral) 
equality. It simply rests on the observation that, if the expertÕs authority over S is justified 
instrumentally, then certain conditions have to be in placeÑmost centrally, that S can reliably 
identify the expert-authority. This is true whether or not S is treated as anyoneÕs equal. (Even a 
society of slaveholders must recognize that the masterÕs authority over the slave can rest on 
epistocratic grounds only if the identifiability condition is met.) 
The flipside of this observation is that the compensatory argument is potentially more 
limited in its reach, and depends on some broadly empirical assumptions about political life in a 
pluralistic community, and the structure of our moral beliefs and judgments. Since I tend to think 
both (a) that these conditions are unlikely to change and (b) that our anti-epistocratic intuition is 
strongest under circumstances not dissimilar to those we are currently living under, I do not 
believe that this is a significant weakness in an argument against epistocracy. Nonetheless, 
anyone wishing to assess the argument developed here as against other strategies for defeating 
epistocratic conclusions should be aware of its limits. 
 
 
V. Assigning Offices 
 
The previous section argued that our difficulty in identifying whether someone is an expert on the 
kinds of questions that the law purports to authoritatively settle for us undermines the basic 
justification for political authority based on expertise. This section considers its effects on the 
second, distinct issue that may be involved in discussions of epistocracy: what I earlier called the 
Òexpertise-office claim,Ó according to which political offices that have authority on expertise-
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independent grounds should nonetheless be filled by experts rather than non-experts.  
It is worth distinguishing between three different positions, of decreasing strength, that may 
be involved here. First, experts have a right to an office (and others a corresponding duty to see to 
it that the office be granted to them). Second, there are generally conclusive reasons (though not 
duties) to fill the office with experts. Third, there are some reasons for seeing to it that offices are 
filled by experts, though these reasons are not generally, or perhaps ever, conclusive. I will 
propose here that we have good reason to reject the first two, but not the third.  
Let me start with the claim that expertise entitles one to hold an office. The entitlement 
argument is no more persuasive here than it was when we discussed the expertise-obedience 
claim. As I suggested in section II, the most intuitive such argument appeals to desert: the expert, 
qua expert, deserves the honor that comes with holding an office of authority. The difficulty with 
this argument is, however, that we have no basis for thinking that an expert deserves the office. 
Or, to put the matter differently: even if the expert deserves to be recognized, why should she be 
recognized by being awarded this (or any) office, rather than by a Nobel Prize, a sum of money, 
or a framed note of congratulations? (That the fastest runner deserves the prize doesnÕt tell us yet 
what prize he deserves.) So the entitlement claim fails simply for lack of adequate foundations.  
What about the second position, that even if experts are not entitled to offices, there are 
normally conclusive reasons to assign the office to them? In section II, I briefly sketched what I 
take to be the best argument for this: Even if an office has authority over matter M independently 
of the expertise of the office-holder, we have reason to assign that office to an expert if that 
expert has expertise-based authority on the same matter M and there would otherwise be a risk of 
conflict between the expertÕs personal authority and the office-holderÕs institutional authority. 
This is a good reason for taking seriously the thought that, if there is expertise-based authority, 
the expert should be assigned the office regulating the area of his expertise. But this argument 
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loses most of its force if, as I argued in the previous section, there is normally no expertise-based 
political authority that could generally conflict with the institutional authority the state claims for 
its officials.
37
 As the threat of conflicting duties diminishes, so does the need to accommodate the 
competing authority claims by unifying them through the assignment of offices to experts.  
Where does this leave us with regard to the third position, according to which we have 
some reason to see to it that offices are filled by more rather than less reliable decision-makers? 
How reliably we can judge issues of reliability matters here too: Anyone who tries to improve the 
reliability of institutions by ensuring that a more reliable person fills the office must thus also 
take into account the risk that she is an unreliable judge of those features that make someone 
reliable, and must discount the significance she attaches to the purportedly reliability-indicating 
features accordingly. In practice the significance of this constraint increases as the effects of her 
choice extend into the future: A constitutional designer who must decide what rules ought to 
govern the assignment of offices, if not in perpetuity, then at least for decades or even centuries, 
should consider that the most important virtues required for discharging official responsibilities 
may change with the problems the polity faces. A rule that selects for features that make an 
office-holder reliable with regard to the problems we now deem important may exclude others 
whose virtues are more valuable for solving the quite different problems our polity encounters in 
the future. By contrast, voters considering who should fill an office for the next two, four, or six 
years are reasonably much less concerned with the risk that the features that are currently 
associated with reliability will become less important as circumstances change. 
Crucially, however, while institutional designers or voters must ask themselves how 
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 That there is no expertise-based political authority does not entail that there could not be expertise-based authority 
over some people with regard to some issues. This would have to be taken into account in assessing how offices 
ought to be assigned. But if coordination is sufficiently important, then experts incapable of coordinating the efforts 
of many people will commonly lack authority even over those who can recognize them. So the risk of conflict is 
small. 
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reliable they are in judging reliability, they need not ask how reliable those subject to the office-
holderÕs authority are when it comes to judging her reliability. If the office carries authority, and 
the subjects recognize that and act on this recognition, then they benefit from the office-holderÕs 
greater reliability whether or not they can reliably identify that she is more reliable. Imagine we 
all look to the bearer of office O to coordinate our collective endeavors. If A fills O, we will do as 
A says. If B fills O, we will do as B says. Now imagine A is more reliable than B; but we, the 
subjects, have no way of finding that out given our limited information. Still, we are better off 
living under an arrangement where A exercises the authority that comes with O than where B 
does. So if the office-holderÕs authority is justified on independent grounds, then those who can 
reliably identify which (type of) person is more reliable have reason to act on this judgment, and 
take steps to ensure that the office is indeed assigned to that person (for instance, by voting for 
her), even if those who live under the office-holderÕs authority are in no position to reliably 
identify the office-holderÕs reliability.
38
   
Let me conclude by highlighting that allowing for considerations of expertise to enter into 
the assignment of offices is not to say that they are decisive there. They must be weighed against 
competing considerations. Where a concern for reliability would entail imposing limits on 
egalitarian decision-procedures like democracy, they must, crucially, be weighed against 
whatever value there is in making decisions as equals. In fact, I think a stronger claim can be 
justified. Reliability that the subjects cannot identify can nonetheless bear on the assignment of 
offices (I argued) only if the offices have authority on independent grounds. But this suggests that 
a concern with sustaining the office-holderÕs authority must take at least some practical priority 
over increasing the reliability with which the office-holder makes decisions. If, as many of us 
think, the egalitarian character of our decision-making procedures plays an important role in 
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For a Rawlsian view that would, by contrast, limit the bases on which citizens may vote, see Quong 2011, ch. 9.  
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justifying the office-holderÕs authority,
39
 then a concern with sustaining those egalitarian grounds 
of authority may generally win out against the desire for greater reliability when the two come 
into conflict. But defending this stronger claim is a task for another day.  
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